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Philosophies of the qualitative research interview
Svend Brinkmann

Abstract. In this presentation, I present a general philosophical understanding of the conversation that applies to qualitative research interviewing. In a philosophical sense, all human research is conversational, since we are linguistic creatures and language is best understood in terms of the figure of conversation. I also explore a number of more specific philosophies of interviewing, i.e., practices of using conversations for research purposes. I outline four different approaches to qualitative research interviewing that differ on two axes: First in terms of interviewer style – non-directive versus confronting style – and second in terms of epistemic ambitions – and I here introduce the continuum of doxastic versus epistemic interviewing. Current interviews are typically doxastic in aiming to probe the respondents’ experiences and opinions – ”doxa” in Greek – rather than developing “episteme”, i.e., knowledge that is justified discursively in the conversation. Following Lather, I argue in favor of a self-conscious paradigm proliferation in interviewing research.

Ca. 20 mins.

Introduction
As someone who is attracted to the use of conversations for research purposes, I am often struck by the magic of interviewing. Interviewing is magical because it enables researchers to study domains of human experience that no other research approaches are capable of. Asking people questions about their lives, opinions, and experiences, and allowing them freedom of expression in telling their stories, is a powerful method of understanding people’s life worlds (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2008). Many interviewers will recognize the experience of having made an appointment with an interviewee, showing up in her home, and then, after a few minutes, witnessing the interviewee telling formerly untold stories and secrets that she may never have told anyone before. After an hour or two, the interviewer leaves, perhaps after having given the interviewee a box of chocolates, and the two conversationalists may never see each other again. The interviewee may be thrilled to have been given a chance to talk about intimate aspects of life to a complete stranger, or she may be shattered after having discovered previously unknown truths about her life.
This, to me, is pure magic. It can be white magic, when no one is harmed and everyone is in good faith, and it can be black magic if the interviewer, for example, engages in a “faking of friendship” in order to quickly establish “rapport” so that important information can be elicited to serve the researcher’s purposes (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002). The qualitative research interviewer must strike a balance between the aim of producing knowledge and ethical respect for the integrity of the interviewee. The tension of knowledge and ethics in research interviewing has been well expressed by sociologist Richard Sennett in a book on Respect:

In-depth interviewing is a distinctive, often frustrating craft. Unlike a pollster asking questions, the in-depth interviewer wants to probe the responses people give. To probe, the interviewer cannot be stonily impersonal; he or she has to give something of himself or herself in order to merit an open response. Yet the conversation lists in one direction; the point is not to talk the way friends do. The interviewer all too frequently finds that he or she has offended subjects, transgressing a line over which only friends or intimates can cross. The craft consists in calibrating social distances without making the subject feel like an insect under the microscope. (Sennett, 2004, pp. 37-38).

Based on readings of current interview reports, and supported by Sennett’s observations, it is my impression that qualitative interviewers today are often acting as either pollsters, by passively recording people’s attitudes, opinions, and experiences, or as probers that aim to enter the private worlds of the interviewees to uncover concealed aspects of their lives, e.g. by working with what has been called “a method of friendship” (Fontana & Frey, 2005). In the case of the pollster, a receptive, nondirective practice is followed, where the implicit model of the interviewer resembles Carl Rogers, who developed client-centered therapy and nondirective interviewing (Rogers, 1945). In more postmodern approaches, this practice is sometimes conceptualized as polyphonic interviewing “where the voices of the respondents are recorded with minimal influence from the researcher” (Fontana & Prokos, 2007, p. 53). In the second case, that of the prober, a therapeutic practice of intimacy is often followed, where the probing interviewer appears in the guise of a psychoanalyst.
There are risks involved in both roles of pollster and prober: The pollster risks producing research that is trivial, i.e., research that merely reproduces common knowledge and opinions and does not take advantage of the potentials inherent in human conversations, where both parties have a chance of getting wiser through talking. The prober, on the other hand, constantly risks transgressing the line of intimacy as pointed out by Sennett.
In this presentation, I shall present an understanding of interviewing, where the interviewer appears neither as pollster nor as prober. I do not mean to suggest that these are counterproductive or unethical practices per se. Indeed, important and ethically decent research projects have been conducted based on both of these models. But I do wish to suggest that both models are overused in qualitative inquiry today. Both models work with an implicit view of knowledge as doxa (a Greek word for opinion), whereas I am interested in how conversations can help us produce knowledge in the sense of episteme (the Greek term for knowledge that has been arrived at through dialectical processes of questioning).
The greatest epistemic interviewer in history was no doubt Socrates, who will serve as my main inspiration for an alternative to nondirective and therapeutic forms of interviewing. Along the way, my goal is to explore a number of philosophies of interviewing, and I want to begin by outlining four different approaches to qualitative research interviewing that differ on two axes: First in terms of interviewer style – non-directive versus confronting style – or receptive versus assertive, to use Wengraf’s terminology (2001). And second in terms of epistemic ambitions – and I here want to use the continuum of doxastic versus epistemic interviewing (Brinkmann, 2007).
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Interviews and conversational realities 
Let me say first, though, that in a philosophical sense, all human research is conversational, since we are linguistic creatures and language is best understood in terms of the figure of conversation (Mulhall, 2007). Since the late nineteenth century (in journalism) and the early twentieth century (in the social sciences), the conversational process of knowing has been conceptualized and refined under the name of interviewing. As philosopher Rom Harré has put it: “The primary human reality is persons in conversation.” (Harré, 1983, p. 58). Cultures are constantly produced, reproduced, and revised in dialogues among their members (Mannheim & Tedlock, 1995, p. 2). This also goes for the cultural investigation of cultural phenomena, or what we call social science. We should see language and culture as emergent properties of dialogues rather than the other way around. Conversations – dialogues – are not several monologues that are added together, but the basic, primordial, form of associated human life. In other words, to quote John Shotter: “we live our daily social lives within an ambience of conversation, discussion, argumentation, negotiation, criticism and justification; much of it to do with problems of intelligibility and the legitimation of claims to truth.” (Shotter, 1993, p. 29).
Not just our interpersonal social reality is constituted by conversations. This also goes for the self. Charles Taylor argues that the self exists only within what he calls “webs of interlocution” (Taylor, 1989, p. 36). We are selves only in relation to certain interlocutors with whom we are in conversation and from whom we gain a language of self-understanding. In referring to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein – or human existence – philosopher Stephen Mulhall, author of the aptly entitled book The Conversation of Humanity, states that “Dasein is not just the locus and the precondition for the conversation of humankind; it is itself, because humankind is, a kind of enacted conversation.” (Mulhall, 2007, p. 58). We understand ourselves as well as others only because we can speak, and “being able to speak involves being able to converse” (p. 26). Human reality is a conversational reality.

Varieties of research interviewing
This insight, however, does not mean that all conversations produce knowledge. In fact, many research interviews seem to reproduce common opinions and prejudices, or what the Greeks called doxa. It can be interesting and important to learn about opinions and attitudes, but, when viewed through the lenses of classical philosophy, the outcome will rarely constitute knowledge in the sense of episteme, i.e., knowledge that has been found to be valid through conversational and dialectical questioning. By recording their respondents’ experiences and opinions (the doxa), interview researchers are often – I will argue – engaged in what seems like a time-consuming kind of opinion-polling, for which quantitative instruments such as questionnaires often appear to be much more efficient. But let me explain in greater detail how interviews today are frequently “doxastic”.	
	
Doxastic interviews
Several approaches may illustrate the doxastic aspect of qualitative research interviewing. A classical example is Carl Rogers’ early “non-directive method as a technique for social research” (Rogers, 1945). As Rogers explained, the goal of this kind of therapy/research is to sample the respondent’s attitudes toward herself: “Through the non-directive interview we have an unbiased method by which we may plumb these private thoughts and perceptions of the individual.” (p. 282). Although often framed in different terms, I believe that many contemporary interview researchers conceptualize the research interview in line with Rogers’ humanistic, non-directive approach, valorizing the respondents’ private experiences, narratives, opinions, beliefs, and attitudes, which can be captured with the concept of doxa. “Empathetic interviewing” (Fontana & Frey, 2005), for example, involves taking a stance in favor of the persons being studied, not unlike the positive regard displayed by Rogerian therapists, and the approach is depicted as at once a “method of friendship” and a humanistic “method of morality because it attempts to restore the sacredness of humans before addressing any theoretical or methodological concerns” (p. 697). In line with an implicit therapeutic metaphor, the interview is turned “into a walking stick to help some people get on their feet” (p. 695). This is a laudable intention, but there seems to be significant limitations to such forms of interviewing as well, not least that it becomes difficult to interview people with whom one disagrees and does not want to help (e.g. neo-Nazis).
Already in the 1950s, David Riesman warned against the tendency to use the level of “rapport” in an interview to judge its qualities concerning knowledge. He thought it was a prejudice, “often based on psychoanalytic stereotypes, to assume the more rapport-filled and intimate the relation, the more ‘truth’ the respondent will vouchsafe” (Riesman & Benney, 1956, p. 10). Rapport-filled interviews often spill over with “the flow of legend and cliché” (p. 11), according to Riesman’s verdict, where interviewees adapt their responses to what they take the interviewer expects from them (see Lee, 2008; and, for a related analysis that puts weight on participants’ objections during the interview, see Tanggaard, 2008).
What, then, are the alternatives to doxastic interviews? In the figure on the handout, I have tried to plot four approaches to interviewing that differ on two axes. The term ‘receptive’ comes from Wengraf (2001), who opposes it to ‘assertive’ styles. He aligns the receptive practice with Rogers’s model of psychotherapy, which seeks to empower the informant (p. 154), and the assertive practice is likened to legal interrogations where the interviewer is in control and seeks to provoke and illuminate self-contradictions (p. 155). Wengraf cites Holstein and Gubrium’s (1995) “active interviewing” as a form of assertive interviewing practice (but, like most researchers, he favors the receptive style).
So far, I have mainly addressed the approaches at the bottom, which are varieties of the receptive style. One form, the “nondirective”, Rogerian, or polyphonic form, clearly advocates a receptive interviewer style, and the knowledge ambitions are doxastic. The other phenomenological form of interviewing (e.g. Giorgi’s) does have epistemic ambitions, in the sense of arriving at knowledge about general features of human experience (so-called phenomenological “essences”), but the epistemic process is confined to what happens after, rather than during, the interview. For that reason, I have placed it on the epistemic side, although it frames the interview situation itself as doxastic.
I shall now concentrate on the assertive, epistemic practice of interviewing, in casu the Socratic form. However, there is also the fourth quadrant of the assertive, doxastic form, where Holstein and Gubrium probably belong. Interviews are, as they have argued for long, unavoidably interpretively active, meaning-making practices (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). But unlike Hostein and Gubrium’s active interviews, epistemic interviews are not primarily about conveying experience (doxa), but is a practice of developing knowledge (episteme).

Epistemic interviews
In order to illustrate more concretely what I mean by epistemic interviews, I shall give a simple and very short example from Plato’s The Republic. It very elegantly demonstrates epistemically that no moral rules are self-applying and self-interpreting, but must always be understood contextually. Socrates is in a conversation with Cephalus, who believes that justice (dikaiosune) – here “doing right” – can be stated in universal rules, such as “tell the truth” and “return borrowed items”:

‘That’s fair enough, Cephalus,’ I [Socrates] said. ‘But are we really to say that doing right consists simply and solely in truthfulness and returning anything we have borrowed? Are those not actions that can be sometimes right and sometimes wrong? For instance, if one borrowed a weapon from a friend who subsequently went out of his mind and then asked for it back, surely it would be generally agreed that one ought not to return it, and that it would not be right to do so, not to consent to tell the strict truth to a madman?’

‘That is true,’ he [Cephalus] replied.

‘Well then, I [Socrates] said, ‘telling the truth and returning what we have borrowed is not the definition of doing right.’ (Plato, 1987, pp. 65-66).

Here, the conversation is interrupted by Polemarchus who disagrees with Socrates’ preliminary conclusion, and Cephalus quickly leaves in order to go to a sacrifice. Then Polemarchus takes Cephalus’ position as Socrates’ discussion partner and the conversation continues as if no substitution had happened.
Initially, we may notice that Socrates violates almost every standard principle of qualitative research interviewing. First, we can see that he talks much more than his respondent. There is some variety across the dialogues concerning how much Socrates talks in comparison with the other participants, but the example given here, where Socrates develops an absurd conclusion from the initial belief voiced by Cephalus, is not unusual, although the balance is much more equal in other places. Second, Socrates has not asked Cephalus to “describe a situation in which he has experienced justice” or “tell a story about doing right from his own experience” or a similar concretely descriptive question, probing for so-called “lived experience”. Instead, they are talking about the definition of an important general concept. Third, Socrates contradicts and challenges his respondent’s view. He is not a warm and caring conversationalist, working with “a methodology of friendship”. But still, there seems to be respect among the conversationalists. Fourth, there is no debriefing or attempt to make sure that the interaction was a ”pleasant experience” for Cephalus. Fifth, the interview is conducted in public rather than private, and the topic is not private experiences or biographical details, but justice, a theme of common human interest, at least of interest to all citizens of Athens.
Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, the interview here is radically anti-psychologistic and anti-individualist. Interestingly, it does not make much of a difference whether the conversation partner is Cephalus or Polemarchus – and the discussion continues in exactly the same way after Cephalus has left. The crux of the discussion is whether the participants are able to give good reasons for their belief in a public discussion, not whether they have this or that biographical background or defense mechanism, for example. The focus is on what they say – and whether it can be normatively justified.
It seems pertinent, of course, to ask whether this approach to interviewing is possible today, or whether it should be considered as an ancient Hellenic practice that is no longer viable. I support the former idea, and I believe that it is possible to point to a number of significant interview studies that have employed some version of the Socratic approach, perhaps not in a pure form, but nonetheless in a form that seeks to distance itself from doxastic interviewing.
What Bellah and co-workers (1985) refer to as “active interviews” in their Habits of the Heart correspond, for example, quite well to epistemic interviews, and they represent one worked-out alternative to the standard doxastic interviews that probe for private meanings and opinions. In the appendix to their classic study of North American values and character, the researchers spell out their view of social science and its methodology, summarized as “social science as public philosophy”. I don’t have time to go into this, but they clearly produce knowledge about their subject matter by challenging and objecting to the participants accounts. We can discuss this further in a little while, I hope!

Conclusion
In conclusion, I want to make clear that the distinction I have outlined between doxastic and epistemic interviews is intended as analytical and as a matter of degree. Also, I do not think that one of these methods is automatically better, but I do think that researchers could experiment more with testing their own and their respondents’ statements in public discussion in the course of the interview, rather than just seeing this as something to be carried out behind closed doors. I believe that this could often improve the validity of the analyses, and it could perhaps also create more interesting interviews. Often, the use of challenging and confronting questions in epistemic interviews generate more readable interview reports compared with the long monologues that sometimes result from phenomenological and narrative approaches.







